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Abstract
Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) is an upcoming methodology that
is considered to have several advantages over game theory. ARA so-
lutions for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have been found but
only under strong assumptions which make the model somewhat un-
realistic. In this paper, we use ARA methodology to model FPSB
auctions using more realistic assumptions. We define a new utility
function that considers bidders’ wealth, we assume a reserve price and
find solutions not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse as well
as risk-seeking bidders. We model the problem using ARA for the
non-strategic play and the Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) solution
concepts.
1 Introduction
1.1 Decision vs Game Theoretic Approach
The use of auctions is from time immemorial. The first modern academic pa-
per using decision theoretic model for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions1
was presented by Friedman (1956). Capen et al. (1971) and Keefer et al.
(1991) reported that in practice, bidders do indeed use decision theory.
1Bidders place their bids in sealed envelopes and simultaneously hand over them to the
auctioneer. Those envelopes are then opened and the bidder with the highest bid wins
and pays the amount equal to the bid.
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On the other hand, Bayesian game theoretic approaches were proposed
as well for these auctions. Vickrey (1961) analysed n bidders in FPSB auc-
tions with the values drawn from a uniform distribution with common sup-
port. Criesmer et al. (1967) analysed the equilibrium of FPSB auctions in
which bidders’ valuations were drawn from uniform distributions with dif-
ferent supports, while Wilson (1969) developed the first closed form equi-
librium analysis with the common value model (value of the auctioned item
is same for all bidders). Riley and Samuelson (1981) extended Vickrey’s
analysis to n bidders whose values were drawn independently and iden-
tically from a general commonly known distribution that was strictly in-
creasing and differentiable. Then, Myerson (1981) and Milgrom and Weber
(1982), among others, also used Bayesian game theoretic model for auctions.
Cox et al. (1982a) and Cox et al. (1982b) generalised the Vickrey’s model
in Bayesian game theoretic perspective to the case of risk-averse bidders
who have CRRA utility functions. The CRRA utility function is defined
later in Subsection 1.3. Maskin and Riley (2000) analysed FPSB auctions
assuming the valuations of each bidder is drawn from commonly known
different distributions. Goeree et al. (2002); Bajari and Hortacsu (2005);
Campo et al. (2011); Gentry et al. (2015); Li and Tan (2017) among others
also used Bayesian game theoretic models for auctions.
Using a Bayesian game theoretic model requires a strong common knowl-
edge assumption that all bidders who are considered to be strategic, draw
their valuation for the auctioned item from a commonly known distribution.
The common knowledge assumption can be unrealistic because the bidders
may draw their valuation from different distribution(s) and the distribution
used by one bidder is usually not commonly known to others. In fact, often
the bidders will try and keep their information secret so as to gain com-
petitive advantage. On the other hand, while a decision theoretic approach
does not require the common knowledge assumption, it does assume that the
other bidders are non-strategic. Assuming non-strategic bidders may also be
unrealistic because the other bidders may often be strategic.
1.2 Adversarial Risk Analysis
In order to overcome the shortcomings of both the decision theoretic as well
as the Bayesian game theoretic approaches, Ríos Insua et al. (2009) intro-
duced an approach called adversarial risk analysis (ARA) to deal with the
decision making problems in the presence of an intelligent adversary such as
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in counter-terrorism, war, politics, auctions, etc. ARA solves the decision
making problem from just one of the agent’s perspective and treats the in-
telligent adversaries’ decisions as uncertainties. ARA is a Bayesian approach
because subjective distributions are used to model the uncertainties about
the outcomes and about the unknown preferences, beliefs and capabilities
of intelligent adversaries. However, unlike the Bayesian game theory, ARA
does not require that these subjective distributions be the same for all the
players and that they be commonly known.
In order to give a general insight into ARA framework, we consider a two
player simultaneous game in which one player, Brenda (B), has the set of
actions B while her opponent, Charles (C), has the set of actions C. There is a
chance variable S which determines the utility uB(b, c, s) that Brenda receives
and the utility uC(b, c, s) that Charles receives from each pair of actions (b, c).
Figure 1 represents this game in the form of a multi-agent influence diagram
(MAID) where rectangles, circles and hexagons represent decision, chance
and utility nodes respectively. Figure 1a represents this game from both
Brenda and Charles’s point of view while Figure 1b represents this game
from Brenda’s point of view only where Charles’s decision node is now a
chance node for Brenda because she is uncertain about his actions.
S
B C
uCuB
(a)
S
B C
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(b)
Figure 1: (a) The MAID for the two player simultaneous game (b) The MAID for
the two players from Brenda’s perspective
ARA is typically solved using backward induction, where, one first con-
siders the very last node and then solves for each node in the reverse order
until one reaches the starting node. To solve Brenda’s game, we start with
the utility node uB, then solve for the random outcome node S and finally,
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the starting node of her own bid, B. The typical objective (although, other
objectives are possible too) is to maximize the expected utility. Being a
Bayesian approach, one integrates out the uncertainty at the random nodes
and maximizes the expected utility at the decision nodes.
To solve Brenda’s game, she will start at node uB by finding the expected
utility by taking into account her uncertainty about the outcomes S
ΨB(b, c) =
∫
uB(b, c, s)pB(s|b, c)ds,
where pB(s|b, c) denotes Brenda’s uncertainty in S. Next, she will find her ex-
pected utility by taking into account her uncertainty about Charles’s actions
as
ΨB(b) =
∫
ΨB(b, c)pB(c)dc,
where pB(c) is Brenda’s distribution over Charles’s actions. Finally, Brenda
would be seeking to find the action b∗ that maximizes her expected utility as
b∗ = argmaxb∈BΨB(b). (1)
The main challenge in the above modelling is to determine pB(c). Brenda
may elicit pB(c) either by using her subjective beliefs or by using data on
the past auction bids by Charles on similar items or by using an expert
opinion. But, she could also choose to elicit pB(c) by modelling Charles’s
strategic thinking process. For example, she may believe that Charles is an
expected utility maximizer, just like her, and would choose the action c∗ that
maximizes his expected utility. She can aim to find c∗, the action that will
maximize the expected utility for Charles, if she knows about Charles’s util-
ity function uC(b, c, s) and his probabilities pC(b) and pC(s|b, c). However,
uC(b, c, s), pC(b) and pC(s|b, c) are typically unknown to her. She can cope
her uncertainty about Charles’s utility and his probabilities through elicit-
ing random utility UC(b, c, s) and random probabilities PC(b) and PC(s|b, c).
Then, following a backward induction approach similar to her own, she can
find Charles’s random expected utility as
ΨC(c) =
∫
ΨC(b, c)PC(b)db,
where
ΨC(b, c) =
∫
UC(b, c, s)PC(s|b, c)ds.
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Then, she could find his random optimal action C∗ as
C∗ = argmaxc∈CΨC(c).
Finally, she could find her required predictive distribution pB(c) about Charles’s
action c as ∫ c
−∞
pB(ϕ)dϕ = Pr(C
∗ ≤ c).
Now, she is able to solve her decision making problem. This is how Brenda
can optimise her action using ARA framework. However, ARA solutions
in the context of commonly used models such as non-strategic play, level-
k thinking, mirror equilibrium or Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE) for an
adversary’s reasoning have their own modelling and computational challenges
and that also depend upon the decision making problem in hand.
In addition to the applications of ARA in a variety of real life situations,
Banks et al. (2015) considered FPSB auctions assuming that each bidder is
risk-neutral. They performed ARA from one of the bidder’s perspective using
different solution concepts such as non-strategic play, minimax perspective,
level-k thinking, mirror equilibrium and BNE. However, they did not consider
a bidder’s wealth while defining her/his utility function. Also, they did not
model risk-averse or risk-seeking behaviour of the bidders. They also did not
consider reserve price for the auctioned item which is a common practice in
FPSB auctions.
1.3 Utility Function
Previous literature reveals that risk aversion is an important determinant of
bidders’ bidding behaviour in auctions (see e.g. Milgrom and Weber, 1982;
Maskin and Riley, 1984; Gentry et al., 2015, among others). Risk-averse bid-
ders are the bidders who do not want to lose the item. Thus, they bid more
aggressively than the risk-neutral bidders. On the other hand, risk-seeking
bidders are the bidders who are keen to get the item at a low price. Thus,
they bid less aggressively than the risk-neutral bidders. In FPSB auctions,
a bidder does not really know about other bidders’ behaviours. For this
reason, risk aversion is more significant to be taken into account for these
auctions (see e.g. Cox et al., 1988; Kagel, 1995; Dorsey and Razzolini, 2003).
Holt and Laury (2002) stated that the most commonly used utility function
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in the literature of auctions for risk-averse bidders is constant relative risk-
aversion (CRRA) for its computational ease. The CRRA utility function for
a bidder having wealth w is defined as
u(w) = wr, w > 0, (2)
where, (1− r) = −wu′′(w)/u′(w) is the coefficient of CRRA or Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk-aversion (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965). The coefficient
of CRRA measures the proportion of wealth an individual will choose to
hold on a risky asset, for a given level of wealth w. The utility function (2)
is strictly convex for 1 < r ≤ 2 which represents the risk-seeking behaviour,
it is linear for r = 1 which represents the risk-neutral behaviour and it is
strictly concave for 0 < r < 1 which represents the risk-averse behaviour (see
e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002, for more details).
Cox et al. (1982a, 1985); Maréchal and Morand (2011), among others,
used (2) without considering bidders’ wealth and defined their utility function
as
u(b, v) = (v − b)r,
where, v is a bidder’s true value and b is the successful bid.
On the other hand, for example, Lu and Perrigne (2008); Li and Tan
(2017), among others, used (2) while also considering bidders’ wealth and
defined their utility function in case of their successful bid as
u(b, v, w) = (w + v − b)r, (3)
where, they assumed that all bidders have the same wealth w ≥ 0.
1.4 Contributions in this Paper
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We extend Banks et al. (2015) by developing ARA solutions for non-
strategic play and BNE for FPSB auctions for a realistic case, where
in,
• we consider a reserve price for the auctioned item (typically, known
to each bidder in advance).
• we take into account bidders’ wealth.
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• we find solutions not only for risk-neutral bidders but also for
risk-averse or risk-seeking bidders.
• we assume that the auctioned item is normal2 and define a realistic
bidder’s CRRA utility function.
• unlike the utility function (3), where it is assumed that all bidders have
same wealth, we assume that the bidders may have different wealths.
• we use the CRRA parameter r and also define a new CRRA parameter a
to incorporate the effect of increase in wealth on bidder’s risk behaviour.
1.5 Structure of the Paper
In this paper, we assume that we are finding ARA solutions for Brenda (B)
against her opponent Charles (C) in the non-strategic play and BNE asym-
metric case while we assume n bidders in the BNE symmetric case. The
structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present our new util-
ity function and new CRRA parameters. In Section 3, we present ARA
for the non-strategic play solution concept where Brenda assumes Charles
is non-strategic. In Section 4, we present ARA for the BNE solution con-
cept assuming n bidders for symmetric case while assuming two bidders for
asymmetric case. In Section 5, we discuss the results we obtained in this
paper.
2 New Utility Function and New CRRA Pa-
rameters
2.1 New Utility Function
For the utility function (3), the wealth w has been defined in many ways in the
auction literature. For example, w ≥ 0 (Lu and Perrigne, 2008; Li and Tan,
2017), 0 ≤ w ≤ w¯, where w¯ is the upper support of wealth among n bidders
(Gentry et al., 2015) and w > ̺, where ̺ is the entry cost of auction (Li et al.,
2015). However, not all these values of w are possible in practice because
2In economic theory, a normal item is defined as an item for which a person’s demand
increases with increase in her wealth. (Baisa, 2017)
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the bidder can pay the amount of her successful bid b only when her wealth
is greater than or equal to her bid i.e. w ≥ b. However, the utility function
(3) allows b > w which is not realistic. Using (3), Brenda’s expected utility
would be of the form
Ψ1 = (w + v − b)rF (b) + wr[1− F (b)], (4)
where F (b) is Brenda’s probability of winning the auctioned item. The ex-
pected utility function (4) has been used by for example, Gentry et al. (2015)
and Li and Tan (2017) in game theoretic perspective among others. In (4),
wr has been taken as Brenda’s utility in case of not winning the auctioned
item with probability [1− F (b)].
We assume that the auction has no entry cost. Assuming this, the
function (4) is realistic only when Brenda is assumed to be a risk-neutral
(r = 1) bidder because if she loses the item, her wealth would remain same
i.e. w, however, it is unrealistic when she is assumed to be a risk-averse
or risk-seeking bidder. When Brenda is assumed to be a risk-averse bidder
(0 < r < 1), this function shows that she would experience an increase in
her wealth to wr > w if 0 < w < 1 and a decrease in her wealth to wr < w
if w > 1 in case of not winning the auctioned item. Whereas, Brenda would
experience a decrease in her wealth to wr < w if 0 < w < 1 and an increase in
her wealth to wr > w if w > 1 in case of not winning the auctioned item when
she is assumed to be a risk-seeking bidder (1 < r ≤ 2). This is unrealistic
since bidder’s wealth remains unchanged in auctions in case of not winning
the auctioned item irrespective of whether she is a risk-averse or risk-seeking
bidder.
As an example, suppose that Brenda has true value v = $150 for the
auctioned item which has no reserve price. From her subjective belief about
Charles, lets assume that she elicits the distribution F (c) = 9c
8×200
− c9
8×2009
on
Charles’s bid c (Banks et al., 2015). To find her optimal bid, she can replace
c by b and could have F (b) as her probability of winning the item. Using the
expected utility function (4), Brenda can find her optimal bid by solving the
following equation
b∗ = argmaxb∈IR+ [{w + v − b}rF (b) + wr{1− F (b)}]. (5)
Table 1 shows that Brenda’s optimal bid b∗ increases with increase in her
risk-aversion, which is realistic, because bidders bid more aggressively with
increase in their risk-aversion. It also shows that Brenda’s optimal bid b∗
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Table 1: Brenda’s optimal bids b∗ using expected utility function (4) with different
wealth and risk-aversion levels
r 0.90 0.50 0.10 0.05
w = 0 78.93 99.88 135.84 148.38
w = 50 76.44 82.14 87.51 88.15
w = 150 75.69 78.46 81.12 81.44
decreases with her wealth w, which is unrealistic when the item is normal,
because the demand of the normal item increases with wealth (Baisa, 2017).
Further, it shows that Brenda’s optimal bid b∗ can be much higher than her
wealth w i.e. b∗ > w especially for higher risk-aversion levels (r = 0.10 or
0.05). This is unrealistic, because if she wins, how will she pay the amount
of her successful bid that exceeds her wealth?
Now, if we assume that w = 0, then the expected utility function (4)
would be of the form
Ψ1 = (v − b)rF (b). (6)
The first row of Table 1 shows Brenda’s optimal bids for this special case
where w = 0. This function has been used by Cox et al. (1982a) and
Cox et al. (1985) among others for risk-averse bidders. Banks et al. (2015)
also used this function but assuming risk-neutral bidders. Finding the opti-
mal bid using (6) is also unrealistic because if she places one of the bids as
shown in first row of the Table 1 and wins the auctioned item, how will she
pay the amount of her successful bid when her wealth is zero?
We propose to modify the utility function so that w ≥ b i.e. a person is
only allowed to bid a value that is not greater than her wealth. Additionally,
since in equilibrium, bidders never bid above their true values (Gentry et al.,
2015), we bound the bidders’ bid above by their true value i.e. b ≤ v. Also,
we assume that w ≥ v because she can bid and pay an amount b ≤ v only
if her wealth is at least equal to her true value. Thus, we have b ≤ v ≤ w.
Further, we assume that a person’s wealth remains unchanged if she loses
her bid and that this also holds when she is risk-averse or risk-seeking. Thus,
we propose to use the following utility function for Brenda
u(b, v, w) =
{
w + (v − b)a if she wins the bid
w if she loses the bid,
(7)
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where a is a modified CRRA parameter defined later in Subsection 2.2. Thus,
for our proposed utility function (7), Brenda’s expected utility would be of
the form
Ψ2 = {w + (v − b)a}F (b) + w{1− F (b)}. (8)
The above equation simplifies to
Ψ2 = w + (v − b)aF (b) (9)
Thus, using (9), Brenda can find her optimal bid by solving the following
equation
b∗ = argmaxb∈IR+ [w + (v − b)aF (b)]. (10)
The utility function (7) is more realistic in the sense that it allows Brenda to
add up her profit to her wealth after the successful bid. It also allows Brenda
to bid strictly less than or equal to her true value v and consequently to bid
less than or equal to her wealth at any assumed level of her risk-aversion.
Lets assume that Brenda has wealth w = $150, true value v = $150 and F (b)
as considered earlier in this Section. Then, using Equation (10), she could
get her optimal bids as shown in first row of Table 1 for different assumed
risk-aversion levels. Note that she will get these values since her optimal bid
is not affected by her wealth in Equation (10). Thus, this function gives the
leverage to assume any wealth w ≥ v for Brenda and also her optimal bid
to be bounded above by her wealth for any assumed risk-aversion level i.e.
b∗ ≤ v ≤ w.
We define (7) as Brenda’s wealth plus her profit where she could be risk-
neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking in her profit. Thus, by letting her profit
v − b = x, we can show that (7) is a CRRA utility function since
d
dx
[u(x, w)] = u′(x, w) = axa−1
d
dx
[u′(x, w)] = u′′(x, w) = a(a− 1)xa−2
so
u′′(x, w)
u′(x, w)
=
a(a− 1)xa−2
axa−1
=⇒ 1− a = −xu
′′(x, w)
u′(x, w)
,
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where (1−a) is the coefficient of CRRA that incorporates the effect of increase
in wealth on bidder’s risk behaviour and is defined in the next Subsection
2.2.
2.2 New CRRA Parameters
Our assumption that the auctioned item is normal implies that a bidder could
be more risk-averse (or less risk-seeking) with increase in her/his wealth. We
modify the risk behaviour parameter of that bidder who has more wealth
than the other bidder while the risk behaviour parameter for the bidder
having less wealth is assumed to be equal to her/his baseline risk behaviour
parameter which is defined below. Similarly, we compare the risk behaviour
of a bidder at her/his higher level to lower level of wealth. Thus, we modify
the risk behaviour parameter of a bidder for her/his higher level of wealth
while assume that she/he would have baseline risk behaviour parameter at
her/his lower level of wealth.
Firstly, to model Brenda’s risk behaviour at an increase level of her wealth
compared with her own lower level of wealth, we modify the CRRA parameter
as follows:
We define rB to be Brenda’s baseline risk behaviour parameter which
represents her natural risk appetite at her wealth, say w1. Note that rB is
the same as the r we defined earlier in Subsection 1.3. She is assumed to be a
risk-neutral bidder for rB = 1, a risk-averse bidder for 0 < rB < 1 and a risk-
seeking bidder for 1 < rB ≤ 2. Lets assume that her circumstances change
(e.g. she gains an inheritance) and her wealth is increased to w2 (w2 > w1).
At this increased wealth level, we expect her to be more risk-averse (or less
risk-seeking) for the same auctioned item. So, we modify her risk behaviour
parameter having wealth w2 relative to wealth w1 as
aB =


r
1
h
B if 0 < rB < 1
rB if rB = 1
rhB if 1 < rB ≤ 2,
(11)
where, we define 0 < h = w1/w2 < 1, is the fraction of lower and higher
wealths. Note that here, for 0 < rB ≤ 2 (rB 6= 1), aB < rB i.e. if Brenda
was risk-averse (risk-seeking) at wealth level w1, then she is even more risk-
averse (less risk-seeking) at wealth level w2. Also, aB = rB i.e. if Brenda was
risk-neutral at wealth level w1, she is also risk-neutral at wealth level w2.
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Secondly, when Brenda is bidding against Charles who has wealth wC ,
we modify their CRRA parameters as follows:
If Brenda believes that Charles has wealth wC , we define RC as Charles’s
natural risk appetite for the auctioned item that Brenda believes. In this
case, Brenda could draw RC from a uniform distribution U with support
(0, 1) if she believes that Charles is a risk-averse bidder. She could draw
RC from a uniform distribution U with support (1, 2] if she believes that
Charles is a risk-seeking bidder. In this case, we assume that Brenda has
wealth wB where wB > wC i.e. Brenda has more wealth than Charles. Thus,
Brenda’s risk behaviour parameter in this case would be same as defined in
(11) with 0 < h = wC/wB < 1. However, if Brenda believes that Charles has
more wealth than her i.e. wC > wB, she can modify Charles’s risk-behaviour
parameter as
AC =


R
1
h
C if 0 < RC < 1
RC if RC = 1
RhC if 1 < RC ≤ 2,
(12)
where 0 < h = wB/wC < 1 and AC < RC if Brenda believes that Charles is
risk-averse (risk-seeking) bidder in this case. Thus, AC may take values in
the interval (0, 1) if she believes that he is a risk-averse bidder. On the other
hand if she believes that he is a risk-seeking bidder, AC may take values in
the interval (1, 2h] and AC = 1, if she believes that he is a risk-neutral bidder.
In this case, Brenda’s risk behaviour parameter would remain unchanged i.e.
it is aB = rB for 0 < rB ≤ 2.
3 Non-Strategic Play
In this section, we show how an ARA solution for Brenda’s optimal bid can
be found when she assumes that Charles is a non-strategic opponent. In this
case, Charles will bid an amount that is independent of Brenda’s bid. We
assume that Brenda bids an amount b, having wealth wB and true value vB
for the auctioned item. We assume that the auctioned item is normal and
it has a reserve price τ such that τ < b ≤ vB ≤ wB. We assume that τ
is known in advance to each bidder. We define Brenda’s wealth wB, as the
money she has at her disposal. She does not know about Charles’s wealth
WC and places a distribution HBC on his wealth. She also does not know
about Charles’s true value VC and his bid C for the auctioned item. So, she
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places a distribution GBC on his true value according to her belief and then
finds the distribution of his bid C as defined in Equation (14) below. For
Charles, she also believes that τ < c ≤ vC ≤ wC holds, where vC and wC are
chosen by Brenda from the distributions GBC and HBC respectively.
Brenda’s probability of winning from a bid of amount b is given by
FBC(b) = p(C ≤ b),
where, FBC is the distribution over Charles’s bid with support (γ, κ] ⊆ IR+
with γ ≥ τ that Brenda believes and C is the random variable of Charles’s
bid that she believes. To obtain FBC , Brenda divides her introspection into
two parts as GBC , the CDF of Charles’s true value with support (γ, κ] that
she believes and TBC , the CDF for fraction of Charles’s true value p = c/vC
that he bids with support (γ/vC , 1] that she believes. Then, she finds her
subjective distribution function over C = PVC, the amount of Charles’s bid
as
FBC(c) = IP[γ < PVC ≤ c] =
∫ c
γ
∫ 1
γ/vC
gBC(vC)tBC(p)dpdvC
+
∫ κ
c
∫ c/vC
γ/vC
gBC(vC)tBC(p)dpdvC. (13)
As
∫ 1
γ/vC
tBC(p)dp = 1, the above equation simplifies to
FBC(c) = GBC(c) +
∫ κ
c
gBC(vC)TBC(c/vC)dvC , (14)
where, gBC(vC) is the probability density function for the Charles’s true
value what Brenda believes and tBC(p) is the probability density function for
fraction of Charles’s true value that he bids what Brenda believes. Equation
(13) assumes that Charles’s true value VC and fraction of his true value P
are independent. In Equation (13), the whole region of integration has been
divided into two regions for the random variables VC and P in order to find
the distribution of C. Figure 2 shows the division of the integration region
into these two regions. Area between the two curves shows the integration
region between γ and κ. The area A corresponds to first integral part whereas
area B corresponds to second integral part of Equation (13). Thus, using (7)
but with change of notation, we rewrite Brenda’s expected utility function
(8) as
ΨB ={wB + (vB − b)aB}FBC(b) + wB{1− FBC(b)}.
13
AB
c = pvC
(p = 1, vC = c)
γ = pvC
0
1
p
γ c
vC
κ
Figure 2: Region of integration when the bid is a proportion of the true value with
reserve price τ .
This Equation simplifies to
ΨB =wB + (vB − b)aBFBC(b), (15)
where FBC(b) is her probability of winning from a successful bid b.
Finally, Brenda’s optimal bid b∗ may be found by solving the following
equation
b∗ = argmaxb>γ[wB + (vB − b)aBFBC(b)]. (16)
Numerical methods may often be needed to solve (16) for b∗.
Example 1 Suppose Brenda’s true value for the item is vB = $150, she has
her wealth wB = $150 and the auctioned item has reserve price τ . She could
assume Charles’s true value for the auctioned item as a uniform distribution
GBC(vC) =
(vC−γ)
κ−γ
with support (γ, κ]. As she believes that Charles is a
non-strategic player such that his bid is proportional to his true value, she
could assume the distribution for the proportion of his value that he bids
as TBC(p) =
p8−(γ/vC )
8
1−(γ/vC )8
with support (γ/vC < p ≤ 1]. She has a uniform
distribution HBC =
wC−α
β−α
on Charles’s wealth WC with support (α, β] where
α ≥ γ3. Then
gBC(vC) =
1
κ− γ , and tBC(p) =
8p7
1− (γ/vC)8 .
3We assume the same distribution for Charles’s true value and for the proportion of
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Using Equation (14) where c is replaced by b, we get 4
FBC(b) =
b− γ
κ− γ −
b8 − γ8
κ− γ
[
−
√
2
16× γ7 ln
(κ2 + κγ√2 + γ2
κ2 − κγ√2 + γ2
)
+
√
2
16× γ7 ln
(b2 + bγ√2 + γ2
b2 − bγ√2 + γ2
)
−
√
2
8× γ7 tan
−1
(κ√2
γ
+ 1
)
+
√
2
8× γ7 tan
−1
(b√2
γ
+ 1
)
−
√
2
8× γ7 tan
−1
(κ√2
γ
− 1
)
+
√
2
8× γ7 tan
−1
(b√2
γ
− 1
)
− 1
4× γ7 tan
−1
(κ
γ
)
+
1
4× γ7 tan
−1
( b
γ
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ln(b+ γ)
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]
. (17)
Suppose τ = $30 and Brenda believes that GBC has support (30, 200]. Then
substituting τ = $30, γ = $30 and κ = $200 in (17), she can get FBC(b) which
leads her to find her optimal bid by solving Equation (16) for her risk-neutral,
risk-averse or risk-seeking behaviour.
Now, assuming Brenda is a risk-neutral bidder i.e. aB = 1, her optimal
bid by solving Equation (16) for wB = vB = $150 turns out to be $88.04 with
probability of winning of 0.415 and with the expected utility of 175.71.
Now, we assume that Brenda and Charles are risk-averse bidders. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that Brenda chooses Charles’s wealth to be
wC = $150 from the distribution HBC . We assume that Brenda’s baseline
risk behaviour parameter is rB when she has wB = $150. She believes that
Charles’s baseline risk behaviour parameter is RC at his chosen wealth wC =
$150. We assume another level of Brenda’s wealth i.e. wB = $200. Thus,
with the wealth wB = $200, we expect her to be more risk-averse than Charles
who has wC = $150 or even herself when she has wealth wB = $150. By using
(11), we model Brenda’s risk-aversion when she has wB = $200 relative to
wB = $150 as aB = r
1
h
B = r
200
150
B = r
1.33
B . Thus, she could be more risk-averse
when she has wB = $200 relative to when she has wB = $150.
his true value that he bids as assumed by Banks et al. (2015) but with reserve price τ and
additionally take into account the effect of wealth by placing a distribution on Charles’s
wealth.
4The computations in this paper have been performed by using MapleTM
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In Table 2, we show how Brenda’s optimal bids, her probabilities of win-
ning and her expected utilities change with change in her wealth and also
how they change with change in rB. It shows that with increase in her wealth
i.e. wB = $200, she is more risk-averse and consequently she bids higher
than when she has wB = $150. Similarly, having wealth wB = $200, she is
also more risk-averse than Charles who has wC = $150. Moreover, it shows
that her probability of winning increases with increase in her wealth, with
increase in her risk-aversion and with increase in her optimal bid. However,
it shows that Brenda’s expected utility increases with increase in her wealth,
with decrease in her risk-aversion and with decrease in her optimal bid.
Table 2: Brenda’s optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected utilities
when she is risk-averse and risk-neutral bidder with reserve price τ = $30
aB = rB
(wB = $150)
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
b∗ 138.06 128.69 120.89 114.22 108.43 103.36 98.87 94.86 91.28 88.04
FBC(b
∗) 0.743 0.684 0.633 0.589 0.551 0.518 0.488 0.461 0.437 0.415
ΨB 150.95 151.26 151.74 152.46 153.55 155.19 157.66 161.40 167.08 175.71
aB = r
1.33
B
(wB = $200)
0.047 0.118 0.202 0.296 0.398 0.507 0.622 0.743 0.869 1.00
b∗ 143.95 136.22 128.52 121.17 114.34 108.05 102.32 97.09 92.35 88.04
FBC(b
∗) 0.779 0.732 0.683 0.635 0.590 0.549 0.511 0.476 0.444 0.415
ΨB 200.85 201.00 201.27 201.72 202.45 203.65 205.65 209.08 215.05 225.71
We also plot Brenda’s optimal bids in Figure 3a, her probabilities of win-
ning in Figure 3b and her expected utilities in Figure 3c.
Now, we find Brenda’s optimal bids when she and Charles are assumed
to be risk-seeking bidders. Having wB = $200, we expect her to be less risk-
seeking than her baseline risk seeking level rB. Again by using (11), we model
Brenda’s risk-seeking behaviour when she has wB = $200 as aB = r
h
B =
r
150/200
B = r
0.75
B . On the other hand comparing with Charles, she could also be
less risk-seeking when she has wB = $200 than Charles who has wC = $150.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Brenda’s (risk-averse and risk-neutral) optimal bids, her
probabilities of winning and her expected utilities when she has wB = $150 and
$200
In Table 3, we show how Brenda’s optimal bids, her probabilities of win-
ning, her expected utilities change with change in her wealth and also how
they change with change in rB when she is assumed to be a risk-seeking and
risk-neutral bidder. It shows that with increase in her wealth i.e. wB = $200,
she is less risk-seeking and consequently she bids higher than when she has
wB = $150. On the other hand having wealth wB = $200, she is also less
risk-seeking than Charles who has wC = $150. Similarly, it shows that her
probability of winning increases with increase in her wealth, with increase in
her optimal bids and decrease in her risk-seeking level. Also, her expected
utility increases with increase in her risk-seeking level and with decrease in
her optimal bid.
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Table 3: Brenda’s optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected utilities
when she is risk-seeking and risk-neutral bidder with reserve price τ = $30
aB = rB
(wB = $150)
1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90
b∗ 88.04 85.12 82.45 80.02 77.79 75.73 73.84 72.08 70.45 68.93
FBC(b
∗) 0.415 0.400 0.378 0.361 0.346 0.332 0.320 0.308 0.297 0.287
ΨB 175.71 189.39 209.30 240.36 288.39 362.50 478.03 656.24 933.26 1365.39
aB = r
0.75
B
(wB = $200)
1.000 1.074 1.147 1.217 1.287 1.355 1.423 1.489 1.554 1.618
b∗ 88.04 85.85 83.84 82.02 80.32 78.77 77.30 75.95 74.69 73.51
FBC(b
∗) 0.415 0.400 0.387 0.375 0.363 0.353 0.343 0.334 0.326 0.318
ΨB 225.71 234.91 247.42 263.68 285.50 314.32 352.85 402.99 469.06 554.90
We also plot Brenda’s optimal bids in Figure 4a, her probabilities of win-
ning in Figure 4b and her expected utilities in Figure 4c.
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Figure 4: Comparison of Brenda’s (risk-seeking and risk-neutral) optimal bids, her
probabilities of winning and her expected utilities when she has wB = $150 and
$200
4 Bayes Nash Equilibrium
In this Section, we show how ARA solutions for Brenda’s optimal bid can
be found when she assumes that Charles is a strategic opponent and he will
find his optimal bid through BNE solution concept. We assume both the
symmetric and asymmetric cases of BNE.
4.1 Symmetric Case
We consider n bidders for this case. In Bayesian game theoretic perspective,
symmetric case assumes that each bidder randomly draws the value of the
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item from the same commonly known distribution to all bidders. This case
assumes that out of n bidders, the ith bidder has value Vi for the auctioned
item, where V1, . . . , Vn are independently drawn from a commonly known
distribution G to all the bidders who know that each bidder knows G. This
is the strong common knowledge assumption.
In ARA perspective, a quite natural justification is to assume that Brenda
believes that all of other n − 1 bidders will draw their true value from the
distribution G instead of assuming that all know the common distribution G.
In this perspective, we also assume that the ith bidder has wealthWi ≥ Vi for
i = 1, . . . , n. Each bidder knows her/his own wealth and has a distribution
H to know about other bidders’ wealths. We assume that Brenda is the first
bidder among n bidders who has true value v1 and wealth w1 for the item
and consequently bids b(v1). For simplicity, we relabel w1 to w and v1 to v.
Thus, using (7), Brenda’s expected utility having bid function b(v) would
be
[w + {v − b(v)}a]IP[Brenda wins] + wIP[Brenda loses].
The bidding function, b(v) would be winning bid if and only if all other
bidders bid b(vi) for i = 2, . . . , n are less than b(v). Now, as each bidder
independently draws her/his value, it would happen with probability G(v)n−1
for the remaining n−1 bidders. So, her expected utility by bidding b(v) would
be
[w + {v − b(v)}a]G(v)n−1 + w[1−G(v)n−1], (18)
which simplifies to
w + [v − b(v)]aG(v)n−1. (19)
If we assume that all bidders are risk-averse, then, a = r
1
h is CRRA
parameter, r is the baseline risk-aversion that can take any value in the
interval (0, 1), h = W ∗/w where w > W ∗ and W ∗ is the highest wealth she
believes among other n−1 bidders. To find W ∗ for example, she can use the
mean of nth order statistic of H of other n−1 bidders. In this case, she could
have a uniform distribution U with support (0, 1) to know the risk-aversion
of her rivals. On the other hand if w ≤ W ∗ i.e. she believes that her wealth
is less than or equal to at least one of the other n − 1 bidders, then her
risk-aversion would be a = r. In this case, she believes that at least one of
her rivals having more wealth could be more risk-averse than her.
Now, if we assume that all bidders are risk-seeking then, a = rh where
w > W ∗ and r is the baseline risk-seeking parameter that can take any value
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in the interval (1, 2]. In this case, she could have a uniform distribution U
with support (1, 2] to know the risk-seeking behaviour of her rivals. On the
other hand if w ≤W ∗ i.e. she believes that her wealth is less than or equal to
at least one of the other n−1 bidders, then her risk-seeking parameter would
be a = r. In this case, she believes that her rivals’ risk-seeking parameter
takes values in the interval (1, 2h] i.e. at least one of her rivals could be less
risk-seeking than her.
If we assume that all bidders are risk-neutral then, a = r and their optimal
bid would be independent of their wealth.
For all other n− 1 bidders with their own wealth wi and own true values
vi, the expression (19) would hold. The equilibrium bid should be b(vi) for
the ith bidder. As this is an optimum of function (19) and b(·) is continuous,
it follows that
b(v) = maxx{w + [v − b(x)]aG(x)n−1},
for x in some ball around v. At that value of x, the derivative of the above
expression must be zero.
0 =
d
dx
[w + {v − b(x)}aG(x)n−1],
b′(v) +
n− 1
a
G′(v)G(v)−1b(v) =
v(n− 1)
a
G′(v)G(v)−1.
Solving the above differential equation for any v in (γ, κ] with γ ≥ τ , we get
b(v) =
n−1
a
∫ v
γ
zG′(z)G(z)
n−1
a
−1dz
G(v)
n−1
a
, (20)
where a = r
1
h for risk-averse bidders and a = rh for risk-seeking bidders if
w > W ∗ otherwise a = r. In general, the integral in above expression needs
numerical solution.
Example 2 Suppose that the value each bidder holds is an independent draw
from the uniform distribution G(v) = v−γ
κ−γ
with support (γ, κ] and the auc-
tioned item has reserve price τ such that γ ≥ τ . It is also assumed that each
bidder draws other bidders’ wealth from the distribution H(w) = w−α
β−α
with
support [α, β] such that α ≥ γ. Assuming Brenda and all other bidders are
risk-neutral i.e. a = 1, the closed form equilibrium bid function for Equation
(20) would be
b(v) =
γ
n
+
(n− 1)
n
v.
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Assuming v = $150, τ = γ = $30 and κ = $200, Figure 5 shows that
Brenda’s bid increases with an increase in the number of bidders n.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n
90
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110
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130
140
b(
v
)
Figure 5: Brenda’s (risk-neutral) optimal bids for different values of n
Now, we assume that Brenda and all other bidders are risk-averse. We
take two cases. In the first case, we assume that w > W ∗ and in the second
case, we assume that w ≤W ∗.
1. Let Brenda have wealth w = $250 > W ∗ and finds the highest wealth
W ∗ among other n − 1 bidders by placing a subjective distribution on
their wealth as given by
h(w) =
1
β − α, α ≤ w ≤ β,
where h(w) is the pdf of W . Let W(1) < W(2) < W(3) < · · · < Wk be the
order statistics of W where k is the highest order statistic among other
n − 1 bidders. Let l(wk) be the distribution of kth order statistic and
could be found as
l(wk) = kh(w)H(w)
k−1.
Now, the mean of the kth order statistic is
E(Wk) =
k × β + α
k + 1
Assuming β = 250, α = 50, k = n− 1 and substituting these values in
the above Equation, we get
E(Wk) = W
∗ =
(n− 1)× 250 + 50
n
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In this case, her risk-aversion would be a = r
1
h = r
w
W∗ and r is assumed
to take any value in the interval (0, 1).
2. Let Brenda have wealth w = $150 ≤W ∗. In this case, her risk-aversion
would be a = r.
For both cases, the closed form equilibrium bid function for Equation (20)
would be
b(v) =
γa
n− 1 + a +
(n− 1)
n− 1 + av. (21)
Figure 6 shows the plots of Brenda’s bid function for different values of n
where all bidders are risk-averse and her true value v = $150 and γ = $30.
Upper graph represents how Brenda’s bid function changes at different risk-
aversion levels for the first case i.e. w > W ∗ while the lower graph represents
how Brenda’s bid function changes at different risk-aversion levels for the
second case i.e. w ≤ W ∗. It shows that being wealthier than the other n− 1
bidders, she would bid more aggressively and could have a greater chance to
win the auctioned item. It also shows that with increase in n, Brenda would
expect an increase in W ∗ and consequently her bid would increase.
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Figure 6: Brenda’s (risk-averse) optimal bids for different values of n and a
Now, we assume that Brenda and all other bidders are risk-seeking and
again take those two cases. In the first case, we assume that w > W ∗ and in
the second case, we assume that w ≤W ∗.
1. Let Brenda have wealth w = $250 > W ∗ among other n−1 bidders. So,
her risk-seeking parameter would be a = rh = r
W∗
w and r is a baseline
risk-seeking parameter that can take any value in the interval (1, 2].
2. Let Brenda have wealth w = $150 ≤ W ∗ among other n − 1 bidders.
Thus, her risk-seeking parameter in this case would be a = r.
For these cases, we will have the same closed form solution as we find in (21)
but with a = rh.
Figure 7 shows the plots of Brenda’s bid function for different values of n
where all bidders are risk-seeking and her true value v = $150 and γ = $30.
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Upper graph represents how Brenda’s bid function changes at different risk-
seeking levels for the first case i.e. w > W ∗ while the lower graph represents
how Brenda’s bid function changes at different risk-seeking levels for the sec-
ond case i.e. w ≤ W ∗. It shows that being wealthier than the other n − 1
bidders, she could be less risk-seeking, could bid higher than the other bidders
and could have greater chance to win the auctioned item. It also shows that
with increase in n, Brenda would expect an increase in W ∗ and consequently
her bid would increase.
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Figure 7: Brenda’s (risk-seeking) optimal bids for different values of n and a
4.2 Asymmetric Case
We consider there are two bidders, Brenda and Charles for this case. Bayesian
game theoretic perspective for the asymmetric case assumes that both Brenda
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and Charles draw their valuations for the item not from the same but from
different distributions which are commonly known to each bidder.
ARA solves the problem from Brenda’s perspective where she believes
that Charles will randomly draw the value of the item for Brenda from a
distribution which is different from his own distribution and it assumes that
the distributions are not commonly known to both bidders. So, Brenda does
not know about Charles true value vC for the auctioned item and his wealth
wC and places distributions GBC on his true value and HBC on his wealth.
Likewise, she believes that Charles also does not know about her true value
vB for the auctioned item and her wealth wB and he places distributions GCB
on her true value and HCB on her wealth.
Thus, Brenda would solve
maxb{WB + (VB − b)ABGBC(vC(b))}
maxb{WC + (VC − b)ACGCB(vB(b))}
(22)
where b = b(vi) for i = B,C are Brenda and Charles’s bid functions re-
spectively, WB ∼ HCB is Charles’s belief about Brenda’s wealth that she
believes, VB ∼ GCB is Charles’s belief about Brenda true value that Brenda
believes, WC ∼ HBC is Brenda’s belief about Charles’s wealth, VC ∼ GBC
is Brenda’s belief about Charles’s true value, AC is Brenda’s belief about
Charles’s risk behaviour parameter as defined in (12) and AB is Charles’s
belief about Brenda’s risk-behaviour that Brenda believes which is defined
as
AB =


R
1
h
B if 0 < RB < 1
RB if RB = 1
RhB if 1 < RB ≤ 2.
(23)
where RB is Charles’s belief about Brenda’s baseline risk behaviour param-
eter that she believes and h = wC/wB. Note that if wC > wB, then Brenda
believes that Charles’s risk behaviour would be AC as defined in Equation
(12) and that of her risk behaviour would be AB = RB. However, if wB > wC ,
then Brenda believes that Charles’s risk behaviour would be AC = RC and
that of her risk behaviour would be AB as defined in Equation (23). Figure
8 is the MAID that represents the asymmetric case for two bidders.
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Figure 8: The MAID showing the decision (rectangles), chance (circle) and utility
(hexagons) nodes for the asymmetric auction for two bidders from Brenda’s point
of view
Taking the first derivative and then equating the system of simultaneous
Equations (22) to zero, Brenda could find the system of differential equations
given by
v′C(b) =
GBC(vC(b))
G′BC(vC(b))
AB
{VB − b}AB
v′B(b) =
GCB(vB(b))
G′CB(vB(b))
AC
{VC − b}AC
(24)
Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) stated that in general, no closed-form solution
exists for the system of differential equations (24) when Brenda and Charles
are assumed to be risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking bidders and numer-
ical methods are required to find the solutions. However, Kaplan and Zamir
(2012) found analytical solutions for some special cases where they draw
bidders’ valuations for the auctioned item from the uniform distributions as-
suming the bidders are risk-neutral. For example, assuming VB ∼ U(γ1, κ1],
VC ∼ U(γ2, κ2],
τ ≤ (γ1 + γ2)/2 and γ1 < γ2, they found the following inverse equilibrium
bid functions for Brenda and Charles respectively
vB(b) =γ1 +
(γ2 − γ1)2
(γ2 + γ1 − 2b)z1e
γ2−γ1
γ2+γ1−2b + 4(γ2 − 2b)
vC(b) =γ2 +
(γ2 − γ1)2
(γ1 + γ2 − 2b)z2e
γ1−γ2
γ1+γ2−2b + 4(γ1 − 2b)
(25)
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where
z1 =
(γ2−γ1)2
κ1−γ1
+ 4(b¯− γ2)
−2(b¯− b) e
γ2−γ1
2(b¯−b)
z2 =
(γ2−γ1)2
κ2−γ2
+ 4(b¯− γ1)
−2(b¯− b) e
γ1−γ2
2(b¯−b)
are the constants and the lower and upper support of the bid are
b =
γ1 + γ2
2
, b¯ =
κ1κ2 − (γ1+γ22 )2
(κ1 − γ1) + (κ2 − γ2) .
The bid functions b(vB), b(vC) for Brenda and Charles respectively may be
computed from Equation (25). Note that, in case of risk-neutral bidders,
inverse bid functions (25) would be independent of bidders’ wealth. Whereas,
in case of risk-averse or risk-seeking behaviour of bidders, the inverse bid
functions obtained from (24) would depend upon bidders’ wealth because
AC and AB we defined in (12) and (23) respectively are function of their
wealths.
Example 3 Suppose that Brenda believes that Charles has a uniform distri-
bution GCB(vB) =
vB−γ1
κ1−γ1
with support (γ1, κ1] about her true value VB and
she believes that Charles’s valuation has the uniform distribution GBC(vC) =
vC−γ2
κ2−γ2
with support (γ2, κ2] with γ1 < γ2. The auctioned item has a reserve
price τ which is known in advance to both bidders.
Lets assume that τ = $30, γ1 = $40, γ2 = $50, κ1 = $150, κ2 = $200
and Brenda and Charles are risk-neutral i.e. AB = AC = 1. Risk-neutrality
implies that their bid functions would be independent of their wealths. Sub-
stituting these values in Equation (25), we would have the inverse bid func-
tions vB(b) and vC(b) for Brenda and Charles respectively. Then, from these
inverse bid functions, we can compute the bid functions b(vB) and b(vC) for
Brenda and Charles respectively. The graphs of these bid functions are shown
in Figure 9. This shows that in equilibrium, Brenda having low valuation than
Charles would bid more aggressively.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium bid functions for Brenda and Charles
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have focused on finding the optimal bid for FPSB auc-
tions from one of the bidder’s perspective using ARA while assuming the
bidders are risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking and the auctioned item
has a reserve price. We have developed a new utility function which is quite
realistic. Moreover, based on the argument that bidders’ willingness to pay
for the normal item increases with their wealth, we have introduced a new
CRRA parameter. For the non-strategic play and BNE solution concepts, we
have taken into account the significance of wealth effect combined with the
risk-aversion (risk-seeking) effect and showed that when the bidders are risk-
averse (risk-seeking) and have different wealths, they bid more with their
increase in wealth. Also, risk-averse (risk-seeking) bidders who are more
wealthier, bid higher than the risk-averse (risk-seeking) ones who are less
wealthier. However, wealth has no effect on bidders’ bids if they are assumed
to be risk-neutral.
However, Brenda could have concept uncertainty i.e. she could be un-
certain about the solution concept that Charles will use to find his optimal
bid. In this case, she can put her subjective probabilities ρj to each solution
concept J that Charles can use, with
∑
ρj = 1. Then, she can take weighted
average of her optimal bids obtained from each solution concept for which
the weights could be her belief about the type of Charles’s solution concept.
We have assumed that Brenda choose a value wC = $150 from the dis-
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tribution HBC for Charles’s wealth. However, she can perform Monte Carlo
simulations to determine a value of Charles’s wealth.
As, a critical issue in the application of ARA is prior elicitation. The
practical difficulty of elicitation raises the question of robustness i.e., we
want our model to be robust to the elicited probabilities and utilities. This
could be achieved by performing robust Bayesian analysis. Ríos Insua et al.
(2016) have provided a framework of robust methods in ARA for sequential
games and simultaneous games.
Furthermore, ARA framework could be applied to other solution concepts
such as mirror equilibrium, minimax perspective or level-k thinking assuming
two or more bidders who may assumed to be risk-averse or risk-seeking and
have different wealth levels when the auctioned item has reserve price which
is known to each bidder in advance. Moreover, ARA solutions have yet to be
found for each of the solution concept assuming the bidders are heterogeneous
in their risk behaviour i.e. one bidder may assumed to be a risk-neutral while
the other bidder could be assumed a risk-averse or risk-seeking with their dif-
ferent wealth levels. Also, ARA solutions for each of the solution concept
mentioned above could be found while assuming that the auctioned item has
a reserve price which is unknown to all bidders. Further, it could be interest-
ing to find ARA solutions for the utility function that incorporates bidders
winning and losing regret such as used by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2007).
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